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GENERAL FRAMEWORK
The geographical proximity between Europe and 
the Mediterranean Sea creates an interdependence 
regarding security and many other issues that 
requires dialogue under a practical cooperation 
framework.
Although historically the Mediterranean Sea was 
not always viewed as a bridge because of conflicts, 
between East and West and North and South 
(Catholic or Christian vs Orthodox or Muslim, rich vs 
poor, colonizer vs colonized). But the Mediterranean 
is one sea, even if along its shores different political, 
demographic, economic and cultural subsystems, 
languages, religions and civilizations have co-
existed as well as confronted each other. This does 
not make it any less true that the two shores of the 
Mediterranean shared and still share commonalities 
stemming from a similar environment, and to certain 
degree, a shared past. 
These commonalities became more salient because 
the Mediterranean became a growing avenue for all 
kinds of traffics, legal and illegal, between East and 
West and North and South1.
This setting of partly shared concerns but also of 
sources of differences of interest as well as of mis-
trust and misperceptions make a pragmatic, flexible, 
gradualist and cooperative institutional framework 
such as the 5+5 Defense Initiative dedicated to 
addressing security risks and threats and crisis 
management through proper implementation of a 
set of Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) of vital 
importance in the sub-regional western Mediter-
ranean context.
Because of its geographical focus and its principles 
of simplicity, pragmatism, the 5+5 Defense Initia-
tive, being entirely based on consensus around 
proposals for cooperation freely made by a small 
number of member States had already made some 
progress in the development and implementation 
of CBMs. 
But this should not stop us from asking what 
problems remain and what more can be done. 
A central challenge is reaching an agreement 
around the core aim of “Mediterranean security”? 
From a European point of view this has traditionally 
been identified as challenges originating from the 
southern Mediterranean to its stability such as: 
illegal immigration, Islamic fundamentalism, light 
weapons proliferation, organized crime, terrorism, 
drug trafficking, energy security, potential threats 
to surface lines of communication (SLOC’s), 
asymmetric economic development, and a growing 
demographic gap. Many of these challenges reside 
not in inter-state security, the typical challenge 
addressed by CBMs but in intra-state challenges. 
From a southern Mediterranean point of view 
this concern is often perceived as a form of 
neo-colonialism, associated with a threat of 
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intervention in its internal affairs.
Is this not the case anymore? Have security percep-
tions between the two shores tended to converge, 
especially in more recent years? It certainly seems 
to be the case that European countries have tended 
to become increasingly sensitive to the difficul-
ties and costs (economic and political as well as 
military) of Western armed interventions overseas. 
And there are signs that southern Mediterranean 
countries have come to recognize that transnational 
threats threaten their own security as well as that of 
northern Mediterranean countries. The development 
of the 5+5 Framework as a partnership of equals 
can be seen as a sign of this.
But can will it be possible to develop deeper 
CBMs, involving other dialogue and partnership 
mechanisms which are more comprehensive and 
have more potential of addressing the key western 
Mediterranean security issues? 
Evidently part of the answer will inevitably depend 
from political choices made in the North and South 
of the Western Mediterranean. This is a point we 
will not develop here. Suffice it to say that the 
potential growth of far right populism in the North 
and radical Islamism would cause a serious rift; and 
that any open political intervention of the military 
could pose challenges to further North-South 
military cooperation.
MEDITERRANEAN SECURITY DIALOGUE AND 
PARTNERSHIP MECHANISMS
Currently there is two all-Mediterranean dialogue 
(European Union’s Union for the Mediterranean - 
UfM and NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue) and one 
sub-regional (western Mediterranean) dialogue 
– the 5+5 Defense Initiative. All are the result 
of a gradual reconfigurations of security in the 
Mediterranean area, from an exclusively northern 
states political and military alliances framework to a 
more encompassing multilateral, multidimensional, 
consultative and cooperative regional approach. 
The majority of the 5+5 Defense Initiative member 
states are at the core of the effort, belonging to all 
three major Mediterranean dialogues or partner-
ships (table 1). 
This should in principle facilitate the development 
of a more comprehensive, integrative and practical 
perspective towards the security challenges facing 
the western Mediterranean but, in fact, the aim 
of deepening these two other major dialogue and 
partnership mechanisms has so far proved to be 
largely wishful thinking. This was the result of 
several political and institutional difficulties with 
some arguing that this reduced the two very large 
European Union’s and NATO’s multilateral mecha-
nisms in the Mediterranean mainly to “talk shops”. 
This may well be also the result of a persistence 
of different security perceptions and even conflicts 
between this very wide grouping of northern and 
southern Mediterranean states2. For instance 
among some in southern Mediterranean countries 
there are suspicions regarding the real goals 
behind European Union’s energy security strategy, 
but especially NATO’s latest security strategic 
concept which envisaged a “global NATO”, as well 
as persistent grievances regarding the unresolved 
Palestinian question and what they perceive as a 
Western-dominated international order. On the other 
hand some in European countries have concerns 
with democratization and doubts about the ability 
or willingness of Southern countries in addressing 
some of the illegal trafficking in the Mediterranean, 
terrorist groups that target Western targets are also 
a major concern. The problem is made even more 
complex because neither European North nor the 
Arab South are homogenous, there are different 
currents of opinion and while some value security 
cooperation, others for a number of reasons in both 
North and South look at it with suspicion.
In practice there has been progress although with 
limitations in addressing some of these mutual 
suspicions and shared threats. Limited results and 
limited funding was made available for more ambi-
tions programs of international assistance requested 
by Maghreb countries in areas of military training, 
technology transfer, information sharing. The most 
concrete results were obtained in the areas of 
border control, maritime surveillance, intelligence 
sharing, energy security, counter-terrorism and the 
States
EU’s Union for the 
Mediterranean
NATO’s Mediterranean 
Dialogue
5+5 Defense Initiative
Algeria          p p p
France p p p
Italy p p p
Libya observer X p
Malta p X p
Mauritania p p p
Morocco p p p
Portugal p p p
Spain p p p
Tunisia p p p
Table 1 – Current Membership in Multilateral Organizations
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fight against organized crime, usually in a bilateral 
or multi-bilateral cooperation framework.
The Mediterranean was always important for 
European, especially southern European secu-
rity. However, during decades of the Cold War, 
particularly after 1949 with the creation of NATO, it 
was accepted that primary responsibility for security 
matters, at least hard security matters, would be the 
responsibility of the latter. This had an impact in the 
framing of relations with the Mediterranean.
Certainly the process of European integration – 
starting with CECA in 1952 and then the EEC from 
1957 – had a security dimension, but primarily 
in terms of building a security community within 
Western Europe by economic means. In so far as 
European integration projected security abroad 
it was solely through economic and institutional 
means, via aid to overseas development and by 
trade association agreements. 
NATO, on the other hand, despite its name was 
not limited to the North Atlantic. France and Italy 
were founding members, and very quickly political 
objections were overcome and Greece and Turkey 
also became members of NATO in 1952. This was 
of course all the more natural, given the fact that 
US security guarantees and military and other aid 
to Greece and Turkey was the original catalyst for 
Truman’s speech to Congress on 12 March 1947 
that is seen as a landmark statement of the Cold 
War doctrine of containment. We will not go into 
any details of the complexities of NATO Cold War 
strategy in the Mediterranean, except to underline 
that the US was and is the leading military power 
in NATO, and is and has been the leading military 
power in the Mediterranean for decades. The US 
has maintained a naval presence in the Mediterra-
nean since its independence – generally designated 
in the “Nineteenth Century Mediterranean Squadron 
or Station”. In fact, the so-called “Barbary Wars” 
(1801-1805 and 1815) with northern African mari-
time powers were the first significant US overseas 
military interventions. More importantly, the US has, 
become the leading naval power in the Mediter-
ranean since the early Cold World War, when 
President Truman decided to send the USS Missouri 
in 1946 to signal its resolve to support Greece and 
Turkey, and then set up the US Sixth Fleet that has 
been based since 1947-1948 in Naples3.
Paradoxically, however, contemporary US strategy 
has, in recent decades, had some difficulty con-
ceptualizing the Mediterranean – if we look at the 
mission statement of the Sixth Fleet, for instance, it 
does not expressly mention the latter in its designa-
tion4. The Mediterranean as such is seems almost 
totally absent from American strategic institutional 
framework, official documents and strategic think-
ing. The US thinks strategically in terms of Europe, 
the Middle East or Africa. The primary focus of US 
strategic concerns in this region has in fact been 
the Levant/Mashriq – and has been centered on 
Israel and its neighbors, Egypt and the Suez, as 
well as the oil producing States of the Persian Gulf. 
After 9/11 the American strategic conception of the 
Middle East, has tended to be widened, it is true, but 
both to the East all the way to Pakistan as well as 
to the West5.
After the end of the Cold War, US and European 
concerns converged enough to lead to the creation 
of the NATO Mediterranean Dialogue in 1994 – with 
Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco 
and Tunisia. It was revitalized after 9/11 and 
complemented by the Istanbul Initiative, since 2004, 
significantly directed towards the Gulf States. These 
initiatives are essentially conceived in a classical 
CBM framework, namely aiming at dispelling “any 
misconceptions about NATO”. It has tended from 
the beginning to be unfavorably compared in terms 
of level of investment and commitment with the 
Partnership for Peace directed to non-NATO Euro-
pean and former Soviet States. This is probably an 
inevitable but also a questionable comparison, given 
the very different aims of both NATO and partner 
countries in these different cases, in which the 
question of transition to full membership is neither 
possible under the framework of the Washington 
Treaty nor desirable for southern Mediterranean 
countries. 
In terms of its own modest goals can the NATO 
Mediterranean Dialogue be seen as a success? It 
is an open question whether it has fundamentally 
changed the suspicions and negative perceptions 
of many in the southern Mediterranean about NATO 
and US policy in the region. But as a conventional 
CBMs it is surely better than nothing. One of its 
advantages in practical terms is the very significant 
experience and prestige NATO has in terms of 
training and military experience, as well as the 
framing of the implementation of these initiatives in 
a flexible framework that tries to be responsive to 
the concerns partner countries in a multi-bilateral 
framework, between NATO and each individual 
country according to principles of: “Non Discrimina-
tion, all Mediterranean partners are offered the 
same basis for their cooperation with NATO; Self-
Differentiation, allowing a tailored approach to the 
specific needs of each of our MD partner countries; 
Inclusiveness; Two-way Engagement; Non Imposi-
tion; Complementarity and Mutual Reinforcement”6. 
This certainly seems like a paradigmatic listing of 
basic principles of traditional CBMs.
The EEC/EU started to develop the embryo of a 
specific Mediterranean policy in the 1970s, at 
the very origins of European political cooperation 
with the so-called Luxembourg process. It started 
since then an ever-widening circle of Association 
Agreements between the EEC/EU and individual 
Mediterranean country that now covers all the states 
of the Mediterranean basin that are not part of 
the EU itself7. Unlike US policy, the Europeans did 
give priority attention to the Mediterranean region 
in general, with two EU regional strategies for the 
Mediterranean so far. This is also visible in concrete 
terms in the fact that EU-MEDA aid to development 
of the region comes second only in relative terms 
to aid to Eastern Europe. In 1995 the EEC/EU took 
a further very ambitious step with the initiation with 
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the so-called Barcelona Process of Euro-Mediter-
ranean Partnership; that in turn, led, in 2007-2008, 
to the establishment of the so-called Mediterranean 
Union. These two initiatives, separated by a decade, 
were significantly promoted by a Spanish and 
a French Presidency of the EU. They have been 
important in formalizing and institutionalizing a 
consensus around a strong commitment of the 
EU to its southern neighbors. These two initiatives 
was especially relevant in the context of a Northern 
enlargement of the EU, in 1995, and again after the 
major enlargement, primarily to Eastern Europe, in 
2004. This also means that the Euro-Med process 
has grown from a total of 27 member States from 
both shores of the Mediterranean in 1995, to a total 
of 28 from the EU plus15 member States from the 
rest of the Mediterranean, with the latest additions 
being, in 2007, Albania and Mauritania.
The Euro-Med Partnership and the Mediterranean 
Union are very ambitious in their stated aims. They 
can be seen as paradigmatic of a transformational 
CBM. Ultimately their aim is region-building (i.e. 
creating a Mediterranean region, as a new security 
community based on shared values, shared prosper-
ity and shared security). The tools were, typically for 
the EU, primarily economic and institutional, namely 
the creation of a Free Trade Area, EU-MEFTA initially 
targeted for 2010 and embodied in the Agadir 
agreement of 2004. This was the most obvious 
concrete failure of the process to deliver some of its 
most ambitious and concrete results. It has, none-
theless, created an intense network of exchanges 
that has intensified contacted between the parties. 
But how much impact these Euro-Med processes 
have had on the field of security and defense coop-
eration is an open and complex question, not least 
given the complexity of the development of ESDP/
CSDP8. Still some key elements in any evaluation 
can be briefly addressed. A very large membership 
with 28 EU states and 15 Mediterranean states 
plus the EU Commission and Arab League now 
means that the process has often been portrayed 
as unwieldy and cumbersome. That it includes both 
Palestine and Israel was seen as a key element of 
this Euro-Mediterranean Partnership process as a 
transformational CBM – the Euro-Med process was 
very much, in its origins, the child of the optimist 
born of the 1991 Madrid Conference and the 1993 
Oslo Agreements. It also meant it was soon and 
enduringly affected – especially in its security 
dimension – by the negative impact of the failures 
and tensions in the Arab-Israeli Peace Process.  
The limitations of the Euro-Med relationship were 
made clear by the inability to reach agreement on 
a joint Charter for Peace and Stability at the 2000 
Marseille Summit9. To many members very much 
concerned with their own national security priorities 
and sovereignty in security matters, unresolved 
conflicts between members, means that achieving 
significant progress at the level of EU-Mediterra-
nean relations, even at the level of classical CBMs, 
not to mention transformational ones has been 
very difficult or impossible to implement – The very 
ambitious ultimate aims of the Barcelona Process 
and the Union for the Mediterranean of “creation 
of an area of peace, stability, security and shared 
economic prosperity, as well as full respect of 
democratic principles” seem beyond the scope of 
possibility in the short-term10.
COMPARING 5+5 DEFENSE INITIATIVE WITH 
OTHER MEDITERRANEAN SECURITY DIA-
LOGUE OR PARTNERSHIP MECHANISMS
Multilateralism in a vast scale has been a key prob-
lem. Adding to it is the question of co-ownership. 
While the process is formally a partnership of 
equals, for institutional reasons the EU with its very 
structured and powerful Brussels bureaucracy is 
often seen as being too much in the driving seat. 
Whether this will be at least partially corrected by 
the inclusion in the Union for the Mediterranean 
of a rotating co-presidency and a Secretariat as 
well as the addition of the Arab League remains 
to be seen. What can be said with certainty is that 
that there seems to be a marked loss of salience 
of security cooperation – for instance it is not 
mentioned among the specific priority issues in the 
official website of the Union for the Mediterranean. 
This, in sum, seems to means that the Euro-Med 
process as led by the Union for the Mediterranean 
seems tacitly avows that it is not the right setting 
in the current context for open, candid, transparent 
exchanges in matters of state security interests, of 
the kind required for effective CBMs.
It is in this context, therefore, that the 5+5 
Defense Initiative seems to gain special relevance. 
If compared to the EU’s Mediterranean Union and 
NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue, it’s a more discreet, 
manageable in size and focused on security and 
defense, in terms of classical and even transforma-
tive CBMs in the western Mediterranean. Of course, 
this does not mean that the wider macro-regional 
context doesn’t matter. It would be non-sense 
to argue for negative competition between 5+5 
Defense Initiative and these other regional dialogues 
that have different aims and scopes, or even to 
argue for opting for one over another. However, 
even in terms of the these wider regional dialogues, 
good communication and cooperation between the 
western Mediterranean states may be advantageous 
in terms of helping set the agenda. 
Nevertheless, it does seem clear that in terms of 
promoting classical and transformational CBMs, 
mutual trust and convergence of security interest 
and coherence of views and actions will probably 
be more easily achieved in a smaller sub-regional 
grouping of Western Mediterranean States than 
in very wide multi-regional groups. If this is to be 
the case, will of course require further work and 
deeper commitment from the member-states of the 
5+5 Defense Initiative as well as positive trends in 
terms of the wider political context. Until recently 
there was a strong discrepancy between foreign 
policy and security priorities of the northern and 
southern countries of the Mediterranean rim. For the 
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European countries of Union for the Mediterranean 
countries and NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue their 
main concern was very much about “soft threats” 
coming from the south: illegal immigration, light 
weapons proliferation, organized crime, drug traf-
ficking, energy security, potential threats to surface 
lines of communication (SLOC’s), asymmetric 
economic development, and a growing demographic 
gap. Even if increasingly there was a concern also 
with potential terrorist connections with radical 
violent Islamist groups. On the other hand, for many 
southern countries, albeit not disregarding a “soft 
threat” perspective, tended to give priority attention 
to “hard threat” issues such as the defense of their 
territorial integrity.
The new geostrategic and geopolitical issues identi-
fied in the previous report of the CEMRES research 
group such as: the de facto enlargement of the 
Mediterranean to the south of the Sahel and of 
the Sahara; the increase of internal decomposition 
risks; the stabilisation problems of Libya, including 
a possible re-organization of formerly pro-Qaddafi 
forces and the increased power of local or tribal 
interests; the importance of transnational and non-
territorial risks in a space comprising Europe, the 
Western Mediterranean, the Sahel and the Atlantic 
coast of Europe and Africa; the presence of a 
diffused socio-economic malaise in the area, in the 
Southern Mediterranean as well as in the European 
Union in crisis and uncertain about its model for 
the future and its place in the World; and the dif-
ficulties and, often, conflicts that always come with 
democratization that will only be consolidated if it 
has strong endogenous support, while support for 
established democracies is being shaken by persist-
ent economic grievances; they all brought back the 
importance of a serious regional security dialogue 
and taking into account both so-called “soft threats” 
and “hard threats” in a more comprehensive North-
South approach. 
This possibility of a still fragile convergence 
was also fueled by the so called “Arab upris-
ings” which opened a window of opportunity to 
revise security strategies, redefine the relation-
ship between security, stability, and democracy, 
dissociate national security from regime security, 
and formulate accordingly an improved political 
dialogue and security cooperation framework in the 
Mediterranean in which engagement is a key word 
for any kind of progress regarding a transformative 
approach to Mediterranean security.
In sum the new strategic environment reinforces the 
paradigm of multidimensional security, especially 
when there is a double strategic void - both north 
and south of the Mediterranean - due to the wear-
ing down of northern and southern nation-states 
national defence budgets. In this context the 5+5 
Initiative framework is extremely useful, especially if 
it is kept in its actual operating principles.
Some concrete achievements of the 5+5 Defence 
Initiative in terms of CBMs can indeed be pointed 
out. For example, to the creation in 2007 of a 
Regional Virtual Centre for Maritime Traffic Control 
(V-RMTC 5+5); the creation in 2008 of the Defence 
College dedicated to joint and annual training and 
education of military and civilian staff with three 
level courses (senior, intermediate and junior); the 
foundation of the Euro-Maghreb Centre for Strategic 
Researches and Studies for Western Mediterranean 
(CEMRES), headquartered in Tunisia; and the recent 
creation of 5+5 Defence Initiative official webpage 
where relevant information is available to the 
public, researchers and former Defence College 
students11.
 
2020 PROSPECTIVE SCENARIO AND DEFINING 
AND RE-DEFINING CBMs 
Although evidently always debatable, we have 
adapted the following set of certainties and uncer-
tainties regarding the future security and coopera-
tion dynamics in the area, taken from a Soler I 
Lecha and Dokos’ 2011 study (table 2)12. Based on 
these particularities the scenario we have selected 
is the “mixed” one of three developed by Soler I 
Lecha, not wishing to be either too pessimistic or 
too optimistic. 
The “mixed” scenario envisages until 2020 a 
western Mediterranean area characterized by the 
following vectors: a turbulent political transition 
processes in the Maghreb; troubled civil-military 
relations; Libya as a source of regional instability; 
a dysfunctional regional integration process; a two 
speeds Europe (marginalizing southern Europe); 
anemic economic growth; social and political 
unrest; the region of Sahel as a source of regional 
instability; a lack of coordination and limited trans-
formative influence of the European Union policies; 
the continuing convergence of European Union’s 
and NATO’s “security first” approach towards the 
Mediterranean; occasional fluctuations of oil and 
food prices; continuation of environmental degrada-
tion (desertification and water scarcity)13. 
Following on these assumptions we are now able to 
address the issue of CBMs, particularly its concep-
tualization and implementation.
The concept of CBMs was designed in the context 
of conflict management in the 1970s Cold War 
European context to prevent wanted and especially 
unwanted escalations of hostilities and build mutual 
trust – They can be formal or informal, unilateral, 
bilateral, or multilateral, military or political, and can 
be state-to-state or non-governmental. CBMs can 
be defined in both military and non-military terms 
and constitute building blocks capable of providing 
operational substance to the concept of common 
security. They can also be understood in terms of 
a classic/functional approach as “arrangements 
designed to enhance assurance and trustworthiness 
of states and the facts they create”14, through the 
exchange of information about military and security 
forces (e.g. notification of maneuvers, notification of 
alert exercises and mobilization drills, notification of 
naval activities outside of normal areas, notification 
of aircraft operations and flights near sensitive and 
border areas, notification of other military activities 
which might be misinterpreted); their respective 
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equipment (e.g. military budgets, new equipment 
and arms, unit locations, significant changes in a 
unit’s size, equipment or mission, and major ele-
ments of strategic and tactical doctrine); exchange 
of personnel (e.g. inviting observers to maneuvers, 
exercises and “out of garrison” activities, stationing 
permanent liaison observers at major headquarters, 
exchanging personnel as students or instructors 
at military academies, military schools, and war 
colleges, and exchanging military attachés from all 
three services); and on a functionalist basis through 
direct cooperation mechanisms (e.g. search and 
rescue missions for aircraft and shipping, disaster 
relief, humanitarian projects) capable of mitigating 
the negative impact of potential threats to human 
security.
In the context of the forecasted geopolitical and 
geostrategic fluid evolution in the western Mediter-
ranean area up to 2020, and the security risks 
and challenges they offer to the current regional 
multilateral institutional security framework – due 
to some of the their political limitations – three 
questions arise:
(1) Does the classic/functional concept of CBMs 
need a review in the context of 5+5 Defense 
Initiative? 
(2) Is the adoption of a transformational concept of 
CBMs a better option aiming at 2020? And if not, 
should it be adopted at some point in the future? 
(3) What further classic/functional CBMs should be 
developed in the context of 5+5 Defense Initiative 
until 2020?
To answer the first two questions we need to 
decide if classical CBMs are fitted for the scenario 
posited, and if not, are what are the challenges 
and possibilities of adopting and implementing a 
transformational view of CBMs until 2020?
A particularly important dimension of the transfor-
mational view is the proposition that the changes in 
security thinking facilitated by confidence building 
can become institutionalized as a collection of new 
rules and practices stipulating how participating 
states should cooperate and compete with each 
other in their security relationship. This restructured 
relationship redefines expectations of normal 
behavior among participating states15. The problem 
is that without at least some wider transformation 
of the broader political and security context and 
expectations, it is difficult to see how confidence 
building alone can improve basic security relations 
in meaningful ways.
The 5+5 Defense Initiative as a sub-regional 
arrangement based on the principles of simplicity, 
pragmatism and volunteering seem as we have ar-
gued well-suited as a model of regional cooperation 
aimed at pooling efforts for better risk governance 
and security challenges in the western Mediter-
ranean. These principles provide the Initiative with 
practical tools capable of gradually advancing the 
agenda of security cooperation, as has been proved 
in the last decade. This implies that the adoption 
of a transformational approach to CBMs in the 
Relative Certainties Uncertainties
Job creation and social disparities as major chal-
lenges to western Mediterranean states
Consolidation of the democratic transition 
processes
Islamists forces growing political relevance in the 
southern Mediterranean states
Participation of Islamist parties in the political 
process
Social and political tensions in western Mediter-
ranean states
Role of civil-military relations
Increasing linkage between the security in the 
Sahel, Maghreb and southern Europe
Resurgence of ethnic and religious tensions
Growing environmental vulnerability (water scarcity) Terrorist threats
Continuing migration flows towards southern Europe Piracy threats
Growing food dependency in the Maghreb Ability of radical political and religious factions to 
curtail internal reform processes
Growing energy dependency of southern Europe 
from the Maghreb
Stabilization in Libya and its regional spill-over 
effects (Sahel, Maghreb and southern Europe)
Growing use of new technologies as a social and 
political tool
Improvement of bilateral relations between several 
southern Mediterranean states dyads
Increasing regional influence of reemerging powers Territorial disputes between several states yet to 
be resolved
Speed and depth of economic recovery in all 
countries
Rise of populism and xenophobia in Europe
Escape from the “security first” regional approach
The future of multilateral security cooperation 
mechanisms (UfM and NATO’s Mediterranean 
Dialogue)
Oil and food prices
Table 2 – Relative Certainties and Uncertainties in the Western Mediterranean Area until 2020
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short term may not bring added value compared to 
the classic/functional approach, which has been 
present since the beginning.
Of course it can be argued that the adoption 
in 2004 of a “Declaration of Intentions” by the 
Ministers of Defense was a first step towards the 
implementation of a transformational approach. But 
if that was the case, it should have been followed 
by the development and approval of a regional 
security “Code of Conduct” (a time consuming 
process that requires general consensus) yet to be 
materialized ten years later (to be fair in part due to 
the political and financial turmoil that has affected 
most member-states of the 5+5 Defense Initiative 
since then).
As such we argue that there is no obvious need for 
a re-definition of CBMs in the western Mediter-
ranean area by the 5+5 Defense Initiative. The 
classic/functional approach suits well the current 
goals. And given the scenario sketched above 
for 2020 it is already ambitious and will required 
a strong political endorsement and committed 
militarily implementation during this time frame of 
a deepening not a widening of the scope of current 
CBMs through concrete proposals.
CBMS PROPOSALS TOWARDS 2020 AND AFTER
Before we put forward some proposals we should 
keep in mind that they are only possible to imple-
ment if you have as an interlocutor a functioning 
state and a government. State collapse prevention 
measures are a precondition for confidence building 
measures. It is imperious to preserve the state’s 
authority in this area, preventing the possibility of 
their implosions and the unpredictable impact this 
might have on security of people across the western 
Mediterranean area. This also means, of course, 
that State security should not be made to opposed 
human security in the Western Mediterranean.
When we look at future priorities for the 5+5 
Defense Initiative some are relatively clear and 
consensual, namely those pointed out in the report 
of the first meeting of this 2014 CEMRES research 
group: improved North-South cooperation; improved 
South-South co-operation; the fight against terror-
ism; border security; practical support given to the 
reconstruction of the Libyan armed forces; military 
education. 
There is also the possibility to be explored of creat-
ing effective linkages between the 5+5 Defence 
Initiative and other regional security initiatives 
regarding key points like the reducing technology 
gaps and a focus on human security. Pragmatic 
gradualism and consensus building should continue 
to be the guiding light concerning dialogue on new 
CBMs’ proposals and their respective implementa-
tion.
Aware of the difficulty of the exercise but not wish-
ing to avoid it, we put forward the following CBMs 
proposals based on a two phased implementation 
timeline: from 2015 to 2020 and between 2020 
and 2025.
For the period between 2015 and 2020 we should 
put forward the following deepening in classic/
functionalist CBMs:
At the political level
• Promote a security dialogue and close coopera-
tion and coordination between the European Union, 
Arab Maghreb Union and 5+5 Initiative in the 
context of a comprehensive approach to Western 
Mediterranean-Sahara-Sahelian security.
At the strategic and operational levels
• Schedule and plan joint military exercises on a 
yearly basis and developing agreements concerning 
the establishment of joint border patrols.
• Reinforce cooperation and coordination between 
5+5 Initiative Armed Forces concerning disaster 
relief operations and civil emergencies through the 
creation of a non-permanent joint-staff (proposed 
initially by France and under development in col-
laboration with Algeria and Spain). 
• Reinforce cooperation in Search and Rescue 
missions (SAR). 
• Create a Training Centre for Humanitarian Dem-
ining (as proposed by Libya).
• Reinforce information and intelligence sharing 
mechanisms. Exchange information on criminal net-
works in general, particularly weapons and narcotics 
trafficking, smuggling and organized crime and 
illegal immigration networks.
• Reinforce the current Early Warning System. 
Increase cooperation through air and maritime sur-
veillance platforms between 5+5 countries in the 
provision of information to security forces engaged 
in maritime operations.
• Improve technological and knowledge transfer in 
the security field. 
• Publish a digital annual report of the activities 
developed by the Initiative and made it available at 
the 5+5 Initiative webpage.
• Deepen education and training programmes and 
courses already in place and coordinated by the 
5+5 Defence College.
• Develop a partnership and cooperation pro-
gramme with the European Security and Defense 
College reinforcing networking and augment 
bilateral knowledge and exchange of experiences 
concerning crisis management issues.
• Increase transparency through the publication and 
dissemination at the CEMRES webpage of think-
tanks reports dealing with the western Mediterra-
nean security issues.
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• Enhance cooperation on research with the EU 
through joint seminars and projects between EU-
ISS and CEMRES.
• The CEMRES webpage should be managed as 
potential interface to facilitate contacts not only 
between researchers of the 5+5 countries but 
also those from other countries who are specialists 
in the area and are willing to cooperate with the 
CEMRES16.
• Reinforce public diplomacy activities aimed at 
the general public concerning the 5+5 Defence 
Initiative (e.g. the state which occupies the annual 
presidency of the Initiative should develop during 
this year national information activities – seminars, 
debates and expositions at universities and military 
academies – explaining the aim of the Initiative, 
the challenges and security risks she addresses, 
taking advantage of the 5+5 Initiative webpage as 
an interface).
During the second phase, the period between 2020 
to 2025:
Each country will commit itself to cooperate on a 
draft and approval, no later than 2025, of a “5+5 
Initiative Charter” which will include: 
• a “Code of Conduct” signed by Ministers of 
Interior, Foreign Affairs, and National Defence; 
• a definition of common security threats; 
• a set of other progressive CBMs based on 
multidimensional and more transparent exchange 
of military and security information and intelligence 
concerning the western Mediterranean area: 
• prior notification of military activities; 
• observation of selected military activities; 
• annual calendars of military exercises , etc..
Only after the signing of this comprehensive agree-
ment, that presupposes a significant convergence at 
the political as well as the wider security level – for 
instance, fully overcoming traditional suspicion of 
neo-colonial interventionism or of violent authori-
tarianism – it will be possible to move towards the 
adoption and implementation of other and even 
more truly transformational CBMs, implementing 
a even more effective regional security mecha-
nism capable of addressing with both legitimacy 
and effectiveness the multidimensional regional 
challenges through intra-institutional supervision 
and national verification tools, reinforced by mutual 
transparency and confidence principles which will 
be added to the traditional pragmatic, flexible and 
simplicity that have provided the 5+5 Initiative with 
its current élan.
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INTRODUÇÃO
Em 2011 o mundo assistiu à desintegração de 
regimes árabes no Norte de África, na Tunísia, Egito 
e finalmente o derrube de Muammar Kadhafi na Líbia. 
A queda do regime militar líbio, ao contrário do que 
ocorreu na Tunísia e no Egito, apresenta caracterís-
ticas particulares, desde logo porque as condições 
económicas e sociais da população líbia em 2011 
eram melhores do que as que existiam nos países 
vizinhos do Norte de África. 
Em segundo lugar, as forças de segurança do 
governo líbio reagiram com grande violência aos 
protestos populares de fevereiro de 2011 contra 
o Coronel Kadhafi. Ao contrário de outros países 
árabes, o patrimonialismo do regime e a autoridade 
carismática de Kadhafi permitiram quatro décadas 
de uma governação tranquila sem participação popular 
baseada numa administração central informal e 
numa política de alianças com algumas tribos que 
habitam no território líbio. Neste período da história 
do país foi quase impossível estruturar movimentos 
de oposição com capacidade de participação no 
debate político, pese embora o facto de oficialmente 
a Líbia ser governada pelos comités populares, uma 
versão local do modelo de “democracia direta”. Por 
conseguinte a inexistência de canais de mediação 
dos conflitos com o poder político poderá explicar 
a resposta brutal do regime aos primeiros protestos 
pacíficos da população.
Finalmente, a comunidade internacional reagiu 
à situação líbia de forma musculada, o que não 
aconteceu no caso de outras convulsões sociais 
em países árabes. No caso líbio o Conselho de 
Segurança das Nações Unidas aprovou a resolução 
1973 de 17 de março de 2011 (S/RES/1973) 
através da qual autorizou uma intervenção 
humanitária armada para proteger os cidadãos 
líbios do governo de Kadhafi, alegadamente ao 
abrigo do princípio da Responsabilidade de Prote-
ger, com a preocupação de restituir a segurança a 
todos aqueles que dela tinham sido privados.
Três anos passados sobre a intervenção militar, 
a pacificação da Líbia não só não foi conseguida 
como em termos de segurança e respeito pelos di-
reitos humanos as condições no território têm vindo 
a degradar-se. A onda de violência traduz-se em 
confrontos envolvendo milícias, grupos criminosos, 
tribos e grupos islâmicos extremistas, sequestro de 
embaixadores acreditados em Tripoli, assassinatos 
de membros do governo e a recente destituição de 
dois Primeiros-ministros.
A GEOGRAFIA E O CONFLITO LÍBIO
A falta de um discurso unificador e de liderança 
política central forte com capacidade para pacificar 
as tensões no território líbio é uma questão de 
geografia desde pelo menos o século VII a.C., com a 
criação de colónias fenícias, gregas e cartaginesas 
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nas costas líbias (Lacoste, 2008; Joffé, 2011).
O território líbio é muito vasto, 1.759.540 km2, e 
pouco povoado. Situado no Norte de África tem uma 
posição charneira entre o Magrebe e o Machrek 
(eixo horizontal) e a África Negra e a Europa do Sul 
(eixo vertical). Possui uma vasta zona desértica 
que separa a parte Este do território, a Cirenaica, 
com Bengazhi como capital política no período 
da monarquia, e a parte Noroeste, a região da 
Tripolitânia que tem em Tripoli a sua capital política 
e económica desde sempre ligada ao Magrebe. No 
Sudoeste encontramos Fezzan, zona de passagem 
para o conturbado Sahel. Ao centro o deserto de 
Sirte, muito rico em hidrocarbonetos, forma uma 
fronteira natural de 500 km que separa a Tripolitâ-
nia e a Cirenaica. Refira-se que 95% da população 
é Árabe e muçulmana sunita (Gourdin, 2011).
A “democracia direta” instituída por Muammar 
Kadhafi em 1977 nunca entregou verdadeiramente 
o poder ao povo (Lacoste, 2008; Achcar, 2013). 
Durante mais de quarenta anos vingou uma 
ditadura patrimonial centrada na figura de um líder 
carismático, que diferentemente do Egito e Tunísia, 
não confiava em forças militares convencionais mas 
numa rede de brigadas paramilitares, “os comités 
revolucionários” de seguidores fiéis, líderes tribais e 
mercenários estrangeiros (Anceschi, Gervasio e Teti, 
2014). O exército líbio era uma força mal armada 
e pouco treinada, o que segundo o Coronel Kadhafi 
facilitava a prevenção de eventuais golpes militares 
contra o regime – estratégia que ele próprio seguiu 
para chegar ao poder em 1969.
Em fevereiro de 2011 os rebeldes anunciaram a 
constituição do Conselho Nacional de Transição 
na região Leste do país, com a participação de 
ministros de Kadhafi, como o ministro da Justiça 
Mustapha Abdeljalil e o ministro da Administração 
Interna, Abdul Fattah al-Obeidi, ambos da Cirenaica, 
elementos do exército que desertaram, exilados 
políticos, intelectuais urbanos e também forças 
revolucionárias locais, ex-guerrilheiros islamitas 
e líderes tribais. Neste sentido, as deserções de 
parte do governo e forças armadas de Kadhafi e 
o apoio militar decisivo da NATO (Harlow, First e 
Hishan, 2012; Lacher, 2012) foram indispensáveis 
ao esforço de guerra dos movimentos de oposição 
ao regime. Outro fator que favoreceu o Conselho 
Nacional de Transição foi a geografia do território. 
Os rebeldes sabiam que bastava controlar a 
Cirenaica, ou a Tripolitânia, para que, na prática, 
metade do território líbio passasse para as suas 
mãos, tendo em conta que a zona central do país 
é ocupada por uma enorme faixa desértica que 
separa a Cirenaica da região da Tripolitânia.
O governo da Líbia negou sempre ter cometido 
crimes durante a guerra civil, mas o Conselho dos 
Direitos Humanos das Nações Unidas diz ter provas 
de que as forças leais a Kadhafi cometeram crimes contra 
a humanidade e crimes de guerra - assassinatos 
extrajudiciais, prisões arbitrárias, desaparecimentos 
forçados e tortura. Quanto aos grupos rebeldes 
agrupados em torno do Conselho Nacional de 
Transição foi apurada a sua responsabilidade por 
violações generalizadas e sistemáticas de direitos 
humanos. Em particular, a tribo Thuwar aparece 
associada a crimes de guerra, como tortura, 
assassinatos extrajudiciais, desaparecimentos 
forçados e pilhagens contra os Tawergha – por 
razões raciais, por serem negros – e outras 
comunidades árabes e povos de origem subsariana 
(Human Rights Council, 2012).
Em agosto de 2011, em Sirte, foi proclamada a 
libertação da Líbia. Formalmente o Conselho 
Nacional de Transição saiu vencedor desta guerra 
mas quem na realidade controlava, à época, os 
destinos políticos da Líbia eram as milícias inde-
pendentes de Misurata, Sawiya e Zintan, localizadas 
na parte ocidental do país (Joffé, 2012).
SEGURANÇA E DIREITOS HUMANOS NA LÍBIA 
PÓS-KADHAFI
Mal terminou o conflito o Conselho Nacional de 
Transição assumiu o poder num ambiente confuso, 
marcado por conflitos no interior do movimento e 
acusações de favorecimento das aspirações políti-
cas da Cirenaica em detrimento dos interesses da 
população líbia. De facto as tribos do leste da Líbia 
nunca aceitaram a revolução de 1969 encabeçada 
por Kadhafi que acabou com a monarquia do Rei 
Idris (Joffé, 2011; Lacoste, 2011). 
Com a transferência do Conselho Nacional de 
Transição para Tripoli, capital política do país, 
o Leste do país entrou numa fase de grande 
convulsão. A distribuição de lugares no parlamento 
de transição, entretanto constituído, é o principal 
foco de discórdia. Contrariando as expectativas dos 
movimentos que representam os interesses da zona 
Leste a região ocidental teve direito à maioria dos 
deputados no parlamento, por ser a região mais 
populosa do país (Chivvis e Marin, 2014). Como é 
sabido, a zona de Bengazhi concentra grande parte 
das reservas de petróleo líbio. Na Cirenaica há hoje 
um forte movimento de tendência federalista que se 
opõe às políticas da autoridade central - manutenção 
da unidade política sem federalização do território 
e monopólio da exploração e distribuição dos 
proveitos da venda do petróleo. O governo tem sido 
incapaz de dominar a agenda de segurança tanto 
na Cirenaica como nas outras regiões disputa-
das, estando largamente desacreditado junto da 
população.
A tensão entre o governo central e o Leste do 
território é uma das divisões políticas do período 
pós-Kadhafi mas não é a única. Encontramos outros 
focos de conflito regional na própria Cirenaica, onde o 
objetivo de consagrar um modelo de governo federal 
e autonómico é alvo de intensas disputas entre o Conselho 
da Cirenaica, ou Barqa na sua designação árabe, 
liderado por Ahmed al-Senussi, que contesta a 
distribuição de lugares no parlamento de transição, 
e o Escritório Político da Cirenaica sob as ordens 
de Ibrahim Jodhran, que se proclamou em 24 de 
outubro de 2013 presidente e anunciou a formação 
de um governo local paralelo ao governo central, 
tendo fundado uma empresa nacional de petróleo 
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que rivaliza com a companhia nacional por exportar 
petróleo da Cirenaica diretamente para o exterior. 
Na realidade o problema de fundo é que o governo 
central não controla Bengazi, como não controla 
Fezzan, a sul, nem os territórios a ocidente (Jesús, 
2013).
Outra dificuldade é a infiltração do Islão político. O 
facto do regime de Kadhafi ter forçado os líderes 
da Irmandade Muçulmana a viver na clandestini-
dade – ao mesmo tempo que mantinha alguns dos 
seus membros presos nas prisões líbias (Lacoste, 
2008) - não permitiu a este movimento ganhar as 
primeiras eleições livres, o que não prejudicou a 
reorganização da Irmandade Muçulmana e a sua 
ascensão política no espectro político líbio, no qual 
participam uma grande variedade de formações 
partidárias. Para além da Irmandade Muçulmana, 
vários outros grupos extremistas de inspiração 
islâmica estão ativos no território, como a milícia 
Ansar al-Sharia, uma das milícias alegadamente 
responsável pelo ataque que provocou a morte do 
embaixador americano na Líbia, e afiliadas regionais 
da Al-Qaeda. A caótica situação de segurança 
na Líbia é agravada pelo surgimento de grupos 
criminosos organizados durante o período da guerra 
ou depois do conflito ter terminado.
A escala dos abusos e as violações sistemáticas 
dos direitos humanos na Líbia não param de 
aumentar desde o final do conflito armado. As 
perseguições, detenções e atos de tortura são 
praticados pelas milícias com total impunidade. Os 
8.000 presos da guerra de 2011, essencialmente 
pertencentes a tribos que lutaram ao lado de 
Kadhafi, estão na sua maioria presos à guarda das 
milícias, estimando-se que apenas 3.000 estarão 
à guarda das autoridades centrais. Os migrantes 
da África subsariana, tradicionalmente alvo dos 
ódios dos árabes, têm sido perseguidos tanto pelo 
governo central como pelas milícias. Segundo a 
Amnistia Internacional a tortura sistemática que 
tem levado, em alguns casos, à morte dos presos, 
é mais frequente nas prisões controladas pelas 
milícias da oposição. Os apoiantes de Kadhafi 
são os principais alvos da perseguição (Amnesty 
International, 2014) ao passo que os atos cometi-
dos pelos revolucionários durante o conflito não são 
investigados pela justiça. Assim, os ex-membros do 
governo de Kadhafi estão inibidos de exercer cargos 
públicos por 10 anos, por exigência da população 
e de parte das milícias (Lei 41 de 2012). Por outro 
lado a Lei 38 decretou uma amnistia geral para 
todos aqueles que protegeram ou promoveram a 
revolução (Haddad, 2013). 
O governo provisório não exerce controlo efetivo 
sobre as milícias e brigadas revolucionárias 
tanto em Bengazhi como em Tripoli. Algumas 
das milícias estão sob comando do governo mas 
há grandes quantidades de armamento ligeiro e 
pesado nas mãos das milícias que escapam ao seu 
controlo. Algumas são grupos “revolucionários” que 
provocaram o derrube de Kadhafi mas a maioria são 
organizações que surgiram após a morte de Kadhafi 
e que, tal como os primeiros, não aceitaram a 
desmobilização. O governo central tem patrocinado 
a atuação de algumas milícias numa tentativa de 
impor a ordem no território na ausência de forças 
armadas e polícia capazes de desempenhar o 
seu papel securitário. Têm-se registado conflitos 
entre tribos e outros grupos armados por razões 
relacionadas com o controlo territorial de regiões 
específicas (Human Rights Watch, 2014).
A situação política na Líbia está cada vez mais 
confusa. Desde março a Líbia já mudou duas vezes 
de primeiro-ministro. Recentemente, o general 
Khalifa Haftar lançou a Operação Dignidade contra 
o islão radical que opera em Benghazi. O atual 
primeiro-ministro, Ahmed Maiteeq, que tem o apoio 
da Irmandade Muçulmana e de outros grupos de 
inspiração islâmica, tem denunciado as ações 
militares sangrentas do general Khalifa Haftar 
e parte do exército e força aérea que lhe jurou 
fidelidade (The Guardian, 2014), que já provocaram 
a morte a dezenas de cidadãos líbios. O general 
contará com o apoio dos Estados Unidos e pretende 
impor uma fórmula semelhante à encontrada para 
a questão do Egito, um governo militar para a Líbia 
(Baroud, 2014), numa tentativa de resgatar o país 
da influência do islão radical.
CONCLUSÃO
Passados anos sobre o derrube de Kadhafi ainda 
não foi possível fortalecer um sentimento nacional 
líbio. 
A situação líbia caracteriza-se pela ausência de 
um sistema político funcional. Sem Constituição 
redigida e com um governo fraco, a fragilidade da 
autoridade central agrava-se de dia para dia: as 
poucas instituições existentes deixaram de funcionar 
– tribunais, parlamento de transição –, os terminais 
petrolíferos estão practicamente paralisados e a 
autoridade do governo central não existe em vastas 
zonas do território. 
A Líbia pode estar à beira de uma guerra civil 
ou de uma fragmentação territorial por falta de 
liderança política. A fragmentação do poder está na 
origem da insegurança e da violência. A ampla 
circulação de armas nas mãos de civis, milícias 
locais, “revolucionários” e movimentos islâmicos 
extremistas torna impossível a vida quotidiana. 
A Líbia enfrenta um problema de autoridade 
política agravada pelo problema de não existir 
verdadeiramente uma estrutura administrativa no 
país, que Kadhafi nunca quis desenvolver. O povo 
não reconhece a nenhuma das fações legitimidade 
para governar. Por este motivo o destino comum 
da Líbia parece cada vez mais distante. O modelo 
final, unitário, federal ou qualquer outro modelo de 
organização política que venha a ser desenhado não 
será fácil de acordar.
Neste clima de instabilidade são reduzidas as pos-
sibilidades de realização das eleições para o novo 
parlamento marcadas para 25 de junho, antes do 
começo do Ramadão. O que está verdadeiramente 
em causa na crise líbia é muito mais do que uma 
mediação internacional dos interesses das fações 
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armadas que lutam pelo acesso ao poder. Tendo em 
conta a influência de várias potências na política 
interna líbia é fundamental que a França, a Itália, 
os Estados Unidos, a Alemanha, a China e a Rússia 
– com o apoio da União Europeia e das Nações 
Unidas – concordem numa estrutura político-admin-
istrativa do território que permita alcançar a paz e a 
estabilidade. Até lá não se espera que a mediação 
do conflito produza resultados significativos.
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